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IT HAS ALWAYS  BEEN  A SOURCE  of professional  pride  to me to be able  to 
tell my undergraduate  students in macro theory that economists know a lot 
about what makes consumers tick. However, in light of the experience of 
the past several  years, I now state this proposition much more circumspectly, 
and perhaps should restrain myself altogether. For the fact is that in the 
last three or four years, the consumer has done few things predicted of him. 
To be sure, there have been some new elements in the picture: interest rates 
at the highest levels in a century; a "roaring"  inflation, at least by contem- 
porary U.S. standards; and a temporary tax increase. But even so, the con- 
sumer seems to have injected his own element of eccentricity.  Among other 
things, he was thrifty in 1967 and the first half of 1968 on a scale then un- 
precedented for the postwar period. And while he regained his taste for 
spending in the last half of 1968, it was rather short-lived. For in the third 
quarter of 1969, the personal saving rate again began to rise, and from the 
third quarter of 1970 through the second quarter of 1971, was in excess of 
the unheard-of level of 8 percent. 
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The time seems  appropriate,  therefore,  to begin  reassessing  the contem- 
porary  view of the aggregate  consumption  function.  It is in this spirit  that 
this paper  was undertaken,  though  perhaps  appropriately  enough,  it deals 
not with a new idea, but with one that goes back at least to Marx and 
Ricardo.  In question  is the notion that different  marginal  propensities  to 
consume  attach  to different  types of income.  Usually the distinction  in- 
tended  is between  labor income  and property  income,' but this paper  fo- 
cuses  on transfer  payments,  personal  contributions  to social  insurance,  and 
personal  taxes. Because  of the 1968  surcharge,  the liberalization  of social 
security  benefits  in early  1970  and  again  in 1971,  the 1970  increase  in payroll 
taxes,  and  the 1970  recession,  these  three  determinants  of disposable  income 
in recent  years  have  all experienced  fairly  abrupt  changes,  and accordingly 
it seems  appropriate  to look to them  in trying  to explain  the unusual  recent 
behavior  of personal  saving. 
I should  like  to warn  the reader  at the outset  that  he is likely  to be some- 
what shocked  by the results.  For one thing, probably  nearly  every  fiscal 
policy  economist  believes  that  one of the quickest  and  surest  ways  to stimu- 
late consumer  spending  is to increase  transfer  payments.  If taken  literally 
(and  I shall  argue  they  should  not be  taken  literally),  the  results  here  suggest 
the contrary-that only about  15  cents  of each  dollar  of increased  transfers 
is spent  within  three  months  of the increase.  For another  thing,  the results 
indicate  that a dollar  increase  in employee  payroll  taxes  leads  to a prompt 
reduction  of more than two dollars  in personal  saving,  thus indicating  a 
superrationality  on the part of the consumer  that may seem counter- 
intuitive.  Finally,  the results  suggest  that in the short  run the bulk of the 
1. In the theoretical  literature,  see especially  Nicholas  Kaldor,  "Marginal  Productivity 
and the  Macro-Economic  Theories of  Distribution: Comment on  Samuelson and 
Modigliani," Review of Economic  Studies, Vol. 33 (October 1966), pp. 309-16, and 
"Alternative  Theories  of Distribution,"  Review  of Economic  Studies,  Vol. 23 (1955-56), 
pp. 83-100. In the empirical  literature,  see Lawrence  R. Klein and A. S. Goldberger, 
An Econometric  Model of the United  States, 1929-1952 (Amsterdam:  North-Holland, 
1955); Lawrence R.  Klein and J. Margolis, "Statistical Studies of Unincorporated 
Business," Review of Economics  and Statistics, Vol. 36 (February 1954), pp. 33-46; 
Irwin Friend and Irving  B. Kravis, "Entrepreneurial  Income, Saving and Investment," 
American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 47 (June 1957),  pp. 269-301; Irwin  Friend  and Stanley 
Schor, "Who Saves?"  Review  of Economics  and  Statistics,  Vol. 41 (May 1959),  pp. 213- 
48; and H.  S.  Houthakker, "An International  Comparison of  Personal Savings," 
Bulletin  de PInstitut  de Statistique  International,  Vol. 38-2 (November 1961), pp. 55-69, 
and "On  Some Determinants  of Saving  in Developed  and Under-Developed  Countries," 
in E. A. G. Robinson (ed.), Problems  in Economic  Development  (London: Macmillan, 
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adjustment  to a change  in personal  taxes falls on saving  rather  than con- 
sumption. 
I, too, have reservations  about these findings:  (1) They obviously  con- 
tradict  much  current  conventional  wisdom;  (2)  they  are  based  only  on aggre- 
gate  time series  data;  and  (3) they  are  derived  in the context  of one  particu- 
lar model. But I believe  that they have sufficient  validity  to raise serious 
questions  about  what  Arthur  Okun  has recently  termed  the "fundamental 
premise"  of fiscal  policy  economics-the notion  that a dollar  of income  is 
basically  a dollar  of income  regardless  of its source.2 
The Model 
The analysis  begins  with  the following  identity  from  the national  income 
accounts:  Disposable  personal  income  equals  labor  income  (L) plus prop- 
erty  income  (P) plus  transfer  payments  (TR)  less  personal  contributions  for 
social  insurance  (SI) less personal  tax and  nontax  payments  (T). Labor  in- 
come is defined  as the sum of wage and salary  disbursements  and other 
labor  income,  while  property  income  consists  of proprietors'  income,  rental 
income  of persons,  dividends,  and  personal  interest  income. 
Since  the national  income  accounts  do not break  down  saving  in a man- 
ner  corresponding  to disposable  income,  it is not possible  to estimate  a sav- 
ing function  for each category  of income  taken separately.3  As a result, 
separate  values  of the marginal  propensities  to save  must be estimated  as 
the coefficients  in an equation  in which  total saving  is regressed  on the sev- 
eral  components  of disposable  income. 
The  analysis  has  in general  been  conducted  in the  framework  of the "zero- 
depreciation"  theory  of saving  elaborated  by H. S. Houthakker  and my- 
self.4  According  to this theory,  personal  saving  is assumed  to be a linear 
function  of the existing  stock  of financial  assets  and  income: 
(1)  S(t) =  a +  bA(t) +  sY(t), 
2. Arthur M. Okun, "The Personal  Tax Surcharge  and Consumer  Demand, 1968- 
70," Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity  (1:1971), p. 171. 
3. It would also be desirable  to have taxes broken  down by type of income, but these 
data, too, are not available. 
4. H. S. Houthakker  and Lester  D. Taylor, Consumer  Demand  in the United  States: 
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where 
S =  personal saving 
A =  stock of financial assets 
Y =  disposable personal income, 
all quantities  being  assumed  to be measured  at time t. S and Y are flows, 
while A is a stock. The stock of financial  assets is assumed  to be non- 
depreciating-thus  giving  the model  its name-with the result  that  the rela- 
tionship  between  the stock  and  its flow is given  by 
(2)  A(t) =  S(t), 
the "dot"  on A denoting  the rate of change  of the stock of assets  with re- 
spect  to time. 
The basic  notion  underlying  this model  is that  the consumer  (considered 
as a fictive  representative  individual)  adjusts  his saving  so as to bring  his 
stock of financial  assets  into line with his level of income.  The model can 
thus  be  interpreted  as embodying  a Stone-Nerlove  stock adjustment  process 
on the stock of wealth,  with the proviso  that the depreciation  rate on this 
stock  is zero.  An important  consequence  of this  assumption  is that  in a long 
run,  steady-state  equilibrium,  saving  is zero.5  Accordingly,  the concept  of a 
marginal  propensity  to save  must  have  reference  to some  limited  interval  of 
time. More particularly,  s refers  to the instantaneous  marginal  propensity 
to save defined  by the condition  that the underlying  stock of financial  as- 
sets  is constant;  that  is, s measures  the  response  of saving  to a change  in dis- 
posable  income  in the interval  before  the stock of assets  is affected  by the 
change  in saving.  This  interval  will  be referred  to as the short  run,  and  is not 
to be confused  with  a period  of one quarter. 
The present  approach  is controversial  in denying  that saving is deter- 
mined  passively  as the difference  between  disposable  income  and  consump- 
tion. Indeed,  the model  in (1) leaves  consumption  to be determined  resid- 
ually.  Hence,  the presence  of real  inventories  in the case of durable  goods, 
and  of psychological  factors  giving  rise  to inertia  in the case  of services  and 
some  nondurables,  does  not enter  into the determination  of the saving  rate. 
These quantities  play an important  role in determining  the allocation  of 
total consumption  among goods and services,  but for total consumption 
the stock adjustment  operates  with  respect  to the stock of financial  assets. 
5. The steady state is defined  by the condition  that the stock ceases to change.  Since 
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RELATIONSHIP  TO THE MODIGLIANI-BRUMBERG 
LIFE  CYCLE  HYPOTHESIS 
Additional  insight  into the model  can be gained  by noting  its kinship  to 
the consumption  function  evolving  from  the life cycle  hypothesis  of saving 
originally  formulated  by Modigliani  and Brumberg.6  The saving  function 
expressed  in equation  (1) can be made  equivalent  to the Modigliani-Brum- 
berg  consumption  function  simply  by replacing  current  disposable  income 
(Y) by its value  expected  in the future  and assuming  a to be zero. In this 
case, the coefficients  b and s must be interpreted  as depending  upon the 
length  of the life cycle  and  the age distribution  of the population. 
However,  the relationship  of the two models  in their  long-run  limiting 
forms  is even  closer  and  does  not depend  upon  the identification  of current 
with expected  income.  A well-known  implication  of the life cycle  model  is 
that in the context  of steady  exponential  growth  in income,  the saving  rate 
is proportional  to this rate of growth.7  This is also true for the present 
model,  for it be can shown8  that in conditions  of long-run  dynamic  equi- 
librium,  or "golden  age" growth,  the saving-income  ratio approaches  the 
value 
(3)  Y(t)  g-b' 
where  s and  b are  coefficients  as defined  for (1), g is the exponential  rate  of 
growth  in income,  and  the "hat"  on S denotes  the golden  age. 
DISAGGREGATION  OF DISPOSABLE  INCOME 
The particular  objective  of this inquiry  requires  disaggregation  of dis- 
posable  income  into the components  listed  at the beginning  of this section, 
6. See Franco Modigliani and Richard Brumberg,  "Utility Analysis and the Con- 
sumption  Function:  An Interpretation  of Cross-Section  Data," in Kenneth  K. Kurihara 
(ed.), Post-Keynesian  Economics  (Rutgers  University  Press, 1954),  and "Utility Analysis 
and Aggregate  Consumption  Functions:  An Attempted  Integration"  (unpublished  paper, 
1953).  This section does not imply  that the model reported  in this paper  is based on life 
cycle notions. Its purpose is merely to note that, especially in the context of steady 
growth,  the present  model has life cycle implications. 
7. See Franco Modigliani, "The Life Cycle Hypothesis of Saving, the Demand for 
Wealth  and the Supply  of Capital,"  Social  Research,  Vol. 33 (Summer  1966),  pp. 160-217. 
8, See Houthakker  and Taylor, Consumer  Demand,  pp. 288-89. 388  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1971 
postulating  a separate  short-run  marginal  propensity  to save  for  each.  Thus, 
(4)  S(t) =  a +  bA(t) +  sIL(t)  +  s2P(t) +  s3TR(t) +  s4SI(t) +  s5T(t). 
Since  savings  are the epitome  of a durable  good, b should  be negative, 
which  is to say  that  the stock  of wealth  is expected  to influence  saving  in the 
same  way  that  the stock  of automobiles  influences  the  purchase  of new  cars. 
The  coefficients  s1 and  s2 are,  of course,  expected  to be positive,  and  on theo- 
retical  grounds  s2 should  be greater  than  sl, as will be discussed  below. 
As for the other  coefficients,  s4 and  s5 are  naturally  expected  to be nega- 
tive. Since  contributions  to social insurance  leave the contributors  with a 
claim  to future  income-rather  than  just a tax  receipt-the size  of S4 will  de- 
pend  upon  the extent  to which  social  insurance  substitutes  for regular  sav- 
ing.  At an extreme,  S4 could  be in the  neighborhood  of -2,  since  employees' 
contributions  are  matched  dollar  for dollar  by employers.  Finally,  accord- 
ing to the prevailing  view,  S3, the short-run  marginal  propensity  to save  out 
of transfer  income,  is fairly  small. 
THE  STEADY-GROWTH  SAVING  RATE 
While, as has already  been noted, the long-run  marginal  propensity  to 
save out of all types  of income  is zero in a steady-state  static  equilibrium, 
it is positive  for a regime  in which  each component  of disposable  income 
grows  at some  constant  exponential  rate.  Thus,  analogously  to the golden- 
age saving  rate given  in equation  (3) for nondisaggregated  disposable  in- 
come, it can be shown  that, in such a regime, 
(5)  S _  sg  L +  s2g2p  +  +S5g5  T 
Y  gl-b  Y  g2-b  Y  g5-b  Y' 
where  g, is the  rate  of growth  in labor  income,  g2  the  rate  of growth  in prop- 
erty income,  and so forth.  Consequently,  the steady-growth  saving  rate is 
seen  to depend  on each  of the s parameters  as well as on b and  the share  of 
each  component  of disposable  income  in the total. 
Since  in particular  the steady-growth  saving  rate  depends  upon  s1 and  s2, 
it is important  to recall  the theoretical  reasons  why the marginal  propen- 
sity to save out of property  income  is expected  to be higher  than that out 
of labor income.  The literature  provides  at least three.  One, stressed  by 
Klein and Goldberger,  assumes  that labor income and property  income 
represent  different  points  on the income  distribution.9  The  argument  is that 
9. Klein and Goldberger,  An Econometric  Model of the United  States. Lester  D. Taylor  389 
those receiving  property  income  have higher  incomes  on the average  than 
those receiving  labor income.  The higher  marginal  propensity  to save out 
of property  income  then follows from the assumption  that the marginal 
propensity  to save  increases  with  income. 
The second and third arguments,  which, though venerable,  are most 
closely  identified  in the recent  literature  with Kaldor  and Samuelson  and 
Modigliani,  stress the functional  rather  than the size distribution  of in- 
come.10  Samuelson  and Modigliani  appear  to believe  that the higher  mar- 
ginal  propensity  to save out of property  income  is an attribute  of the class 
receiving  the income,  while  Kaldor  argues  that  it is intrinsic  to the nature  of 
the income.  In Kaldor's  view,  the prosperity  of business  enterprise  requires 
continual  expansion,  and,  for a variety  of reasons,  it is necessary  that  a por- 
tion of the capital  required  be generated  internally.11 
ESTIMATION  FORM OF THE  MODEL 
As formulated,  the model contains a quantity,  the stock of financial 
wealth  (A), which  can be measured  only with  difficulty,  and accordingly,  it 
is desirable  that  this quantity  be eliminated.  Moreover,  the model  is formu- 
lated in continuous  time and must be translated  into discrete  time inter- 
vals.12  Once  all this is done,  the reduced-form  estimation  equation,  with an 
error  term  (u) added,  is: 
(6)  St =  BjSt_1 +  B2ALt +  B3APt +  B4,ATRt  +  B5LXSIt  +  B6ATt  +  Ut. 
The estimating  equation  is thus seen  to have a particularly  simple  form, 
requiring  only  the regression  of personal  saving  on its own  value  in the pre- 
ceding  period  and on the first  differences  of the components  of disposable 
income.  The coefficients,  B1, .  .  , B6 are functions  of the structural  pa- 
rameters  b, sl, . .,  s4  (a unfortunately  is indeterminate),  and estimates  of 
the former  are  readily  transformed  into estimates  of the latter.13 
10. Kaldor, "Alternative  Theories of Distribution,"  and "Marginal  Productivity"; 
and Paul A. Samuelson  and Franco  Modigliani,  "The Pasinetti  Paradox  in Neoclassical 
and More General  Models," Review  of Economic  Studies,  Vol. 33 (October 1966),  pp. 
269-301. 
11. Neither  the Kaldor  nor the Samuelson-Modigliani  argument  rules out the Klein- 
Goldberger  effect  arising  from the size distribution  of income.  Wealthy  property  owners 
may save a higher proportion of their incomes than do their poor brethren,  and the 
same may also be true of wealthy  and poor wage earners. 
12. The details of this elimination  and translation  are set out in Houthakker  and 
Taylor, Consumer  Demand,  pp. 13-17. 
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However,  the finally  estimated  model contains  one additional  variable, 
the first  difference  of the yield  on Baa  bonds.  This  variable  will be denoted 
by r and its coefficient  in the structural  equation  (2) by m. The reasons  for 
including  an interest  rate  in a model  of personal  saving  are  evident  and  need 
no elaboration. 
DATA  AND  PERIOD  OF ESTIMATION 
With  the exception  of the yield  on Baa bonds,  which  is published  in the 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, the data are  taken  from  Table  2.1, "Personal  In- 
come and Its Disposition,"  of the national  income  accounts,  published  in 
the Survey of Current  Business and its supplements.  The national  accounts 
data  are  seasonally  adjusted  and  expressed  as annual  rates.  They  have  been 
deflated  by  the  implicit  deflator  for  personal  consumption  expenditures,  and 
are thus expressed  in constant  (1958)  dollars.  Two models  have been esti- 
mated.  In the first,  the data  have  been  deflated  by the population,  while  in 
the second,  they are left as aggregates.  In each case, the observations  are 
quarterly,  and  cover  the period  1953  :1 through  1969:4.  The  sample  period 
thus involves  sixty-eight  quarterly  observations. 
Empirical  Results 
The empirical  results  are tabulated  in Tables 1 and 2. Coefficients  and 
measures  of goodness-of-fit  for the estimating  equations  are  given  in Table 
1 and  structural  coefficients  and  their  standard  errors  in Table  2.14 Six  equa- 
tions  have  been  tabulated.  Equation  (1)  represents  the  full  model;  it is based 
on the disaggregation  of disposable  income  discussed  above and includes 
the yield  on Baa  bonds  as an additional  predictor.  Equation  (2) is intended 
as a benchmark  for comparison,  and differs  from  equation  (1) in that dis- 
posable  income  is not disaggregated.  Equations  (4) and (5) correspond  to 
(1) and (2) except  that saving  and income  have not been deflated  by the 
population.  Finally,  since,  as it turns  out, the short-run  marginal  propen- 
sities  to save  out of labor  and  property  income  cannot  be distinguished  sta- 
tistically  from  one another,  the models  have  been  reestimated  in equations 
(3) and  (6) with  labor  and  property  income  combined  (hereafter  referred  to 
as gross  income),  and  with  the coefficient  on gross  income  denoted  by sl. 
14. The standard  errors  for the structural  coefficients  are only approximate  and are 
calculated  according  to the procedure  described  in ibid., pp. 51-52. S~~~~~~~~t  tn  tl 
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THE STATISTICAL  GAIN  FROM DISAGGREGATION 
From a comparison  of equations  (1) and (2)-or,  alternately,  of (4) and 
(5)-the  gain from disaggregation  is seen to be fairly considerable.  The 
coefficient  of determination  (R2) for equations  (1) and (2) is increased  by 
about 4?/2  percentage  points, and the standard  error of estimate  (Se) is 
correspondingly  reduced  by about $1.50 per capita.  In equations  (3) and 
(6), in which  labor  and  property  income  are  combined,  all t-ratios  are  sub- 
stantially  in excess  of 2 (in absolute  value)  and each sign is as expected  a 
priori. 
THE POPULATION  EFFECT 
Comparison  of equations  (1) and  (4) shows  that it makes  little  difference 
to the results  whether  the data  are  expressed  per  capita  or in the aggregate, 
since, except for the yield on Baa bonds, the coefficients  are nearly  the 
same.  While  the  R2 is higher  in the aggregate  equation,  this improvement  in 
fit is only apparent.  When  the R2s are computed  on a comparable  basis, 
they  are  virtually  identical.15 
THE EFFECT OF THE  RATE OF INTEREST 
Disaggregating  disposable  income  increases  the statistical  importance  of 
the yield  on Baa  bonds,  for the t-ratio  for this  variable  is only 1.46  in equa- 
tion (2) but is 2.26 in equation  (3). A priori  one cannot say whether  the 
sign on the rate of interest  should be positive or negative,  for it can be 
either  depending  upon whether  the income  or substitution  effect  predomi- 
nates.  The positive  sign  indicates  that the substitution  effect  is the stronger 
-that  is, that an increase  in the rate  of interest  brings  substitution  of future 
for current  consumption.16  The  elasticity  of saving  with  respect  to r (calcu- 
15. "Comparable  basis," in this context, means that both refer either to per capita 
saving or to aggregate  saving. In terms of the latter, equations (3) and (6) both yield 
an R2 of 0.899. 
16. This result is at variance with the recent findings of Warren  E. Weber, "The 
Effect of Interest  Rates on Aggregate  Consumption,"  American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 
60 (September  1970),  pp. 591-600, and "Interest  Rates and the Short-run  Consumption 
Function," American  Economic  Review, Vol. 61 (June 1971), pp, 421-25. They also 
diverge  from an earlier  result, reported  in Houthakker  and Taylor, Consumer  Demand, 
pp. 293-96. In both cases, however,  the period of fit ends before interest  rates took off 
to their historic highs of 1970-in  1965 for Weber and in 1966 for Houthakker  and 
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lated  at the point of means)  from  equation  (3) is 0.78, while  from  equation 
(6) it is 0.88. 
Because  the rate of interest  is included  as a nominal  rather  than a real 
rate,  I have  considered  some  equations  in which  current  and  past  (percent- 
age)  changes  in the implicit  deflator  for personal  consumption  expenditures 
are  included  as predictors.  When  the current  price  change  is in the model,  it 
takes  on a coefficient  of 13.87  with  a t-ratio  of 2.42,  while  the coefficient  of 
Ar drops  to 5.54 with a t-ratio  of 0.54. The sum of the coefficients  is 19.41, 
which  is very close to the coefficient  of Ar in equation  (3). A statistically 
strong  positive  price  effect  in this case would have to be interpreted  as a 
strong  real-balance  effect  that operates  practically  instantaneously.  While 
nothing  in the logic of the  model  forecloses  this,  I am inclined  to discount  it 
and  to view  the price  change  as a proxy  for  the change  in the  rate  of interest 
rather  than the reverse.  Accordingly,  I have done no further  experimenta- 
tion with current  price  changes. 
Past  price  changes,  however,  were  included  with  a lag of up to five  quar- 
ters,  but the results  made  little  sense.  The  most plausible  results  were  those 
obtained  using  the percentage  change  in the deflator  for personal  consump- 
tion expenditures  over  the preceding  four quarters.  The coefficient  is posi- 
tive, thereby  giving  evidence  of a real-balance  effect,  but its t-ratio  is only 
1.18  and  that  for Ar  falls  to 1.61. 
STRUCTURAL  COEFFICIENTS 
Table  2 reveals  that  b is negative  as expected,  but  that  in equation  (3) it is 
smaller  in relation  to its approximate  standard  error  than  the other coeffi- 
cients.  This  may  reflect  a misspecification  arising  from  the assumption  that 
b is the same  for all types  of income.  However,  it is impossible  to eliminate 
this  assumption  without  a disaggregation  of saving  corresponding  to that  of 
disposable  income.'7 
17. In his discussion  of this paper, James Duesenberry  noted that the coefficient  on 
S,-1 is close to unity and offered  that as one reason to suspect that stock adjustment 
evaporates.  However, in equations  (3) and (6), 1 -  b has t-ratios of 1.83 and 2.25, re- 
spectively,  which  does not suggest  the absence  of stock adjustment.  Furthermore,  I have 
estimated  the counterpart  to equation (3) with a constant  term (the constant is absent 
from  the estimating  equation  because  of the assumption  that  the depreciation  rate  is zero; 
however,  one can be justified  if the error  term  u in equation  (6) is assumed  to have  a non- 
zero mean).  The result  is a b of 0.866 with a standard  error  of 0.062. This yields  a t-ratio 
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As has  already  been  mentioned,  the  s coefficients  should  be interpreted  as 
short-run  marginal  propensities  to save  and  m as the short-run  response  in 
saving  to a change  in the yield  on Baa  bonds.18 
Discussion  and  Defense  of the Results 
Some  of the results  presented  in Table 1 may  be regarded  as unusual  or 
even  anomalous: 
(1) A marginal  propensity  to save out of property  income  that is lower 
than  that out of labor  income.19 
(2) A short-run  marginal  propensity  to save out of transfer  income  that 
is exceedingly  high. 
(3) A very  large  negative  coefficient  on personal  contributions  to social 
insurance. 
(4) A large  negative  coefficient  on personal  tax and  nontax  payments. 
THE  LOW  COEFFICIENT  ON  PROPERTY  INCOME 
Of the several  unusual  coefficients,  that  on the  change  in property  income 
is perhaps  the easiest  to rationalize.  The arguments  summarized  earlier,  in 
particular  those of Kaldor  and of Samuelson  and  Modigliani,  referred  to 
the income  earned  by property  owners  rather  than  the income  actually  re- 
ceived.  Business  retentions  and capital  gains  typically  make  the latter  con- 
siderably  lower than the former.  And because  the difference  between  the 
two is in effect  entirely  saved,  it is not surprising  to find a fairly  low mar- 
ginal  propensity  to save  out of the income  actually  received.  An additional 
18. Recall that the short  run in this context  is defined  by the condition  that the under- 
lying stock of financial  assets does not change,  and should not be confused  with a time 
period of one quarter;  for implicit  in the procedure  that approximates  the continuous- 
time model (4) with the discrete  version  (5) is the assumption  that the feedback  of an in- 
crease  in the stock of assets  on saving  begins  in a period  shorter  than one quarter.  On the 
other hand, if the short run is defined  as one quarter,  then the short-run  coefficients  are 
those given  by the estimating  equations.  In the discussion  that follows, these two "short 
runs" will often be used ambiguously.  The context will make clear which is intended. 
19. This hypothesis  is tested  through  a t-test on the difference  of the two coefficients. 
This difference  is 0.089, with a t-ratio  of 0.31, substantially  below that required,  at con- 
ventional  levels of significance,  to reject  the hypothesis.  However, neither  equation (1) 
nor (4) supports  rejection  of the hypothesis  that the marginal  propensities  to save out of 
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influence  arises from the significant  portion of property  income that is 
imputed  as the rental  income  from  owner-occupied  housing.  Since  an iden- 
tical amount  is also imputed  to consumption,  saving out of this part of 
property  income  is zero. 
THE HIGH  COEFFICIENT  ON  TRANSFER  INCOME 
Unfortunately,  no such ready explanations  present  themselves  for the 
large  coefficient  attaching  to the  change  in transfer  payments.  Theoretically, 
part  of the explanation  could  stress  the fact that any part  of transfers  allo- 
cated  to retire  existing  debt  would  be saved  in its entirety,  but as a factual 
matter  this  can  hardly  be of significance.  The  permanent  income  hypothesis 
could  also provide  an explanation  if one were  willing  to argue  that  transfer 
income is viewed as temporary,  but since transfer  payments  are heavily 
composed  of social security  benefits,  medicare,  and aid to dependent  chil- 
dren,  this,  too, seems  a dubious  argument. 
The question,  therefore,  is whether  any plausible  argument  can account 
for this high  coefficient.  One  might  try to rationalize  the findings  along  the 
following  lines:  Assume  that  there  are  only  two categories  of individuals  65 
or over  who receive  transfer  payments,  rich  and  poor.  There  is little  reason 
to suppose  that  the rich  will spend  an increase  in retirement  benefits  imme- 
diately,  for such income  is likely  to be viewed  like any other  income.  In- 
deed,  for the very  rich,  increased  social  security  benefits  are  unlikely  in the 
short  run even  to be much  noticed.  Thus a high coefficient  on transfers  to 
the rich  should  not be found  unreasonable. 
For poor  retirees,  on the other  hand,  the dominant  consideration  is prob- 
ably  uncertainty-about  the  number  of years  still  to live and  about  the ade- 
quacy  of income  from  all sources.  In short,  what  is present  is one of Irving 
Fisher's  classic  motives  for saving,  namely,  uncertainty  of the future.  Con- 
sequently,  for  poor  retirees  as well  as for  the rich,  a high  short-run  marginal 
propensity  to save  out of transfer  income  need  not be viewed  as implausible. 
Finally,  the only other  study  that I know of that treats  transfer  income 
separately  from other  income  (in this case using  survey  data) also finds  a 
high short-run  marginal  propensity  to save out of transfers,  though not 
quite  as high  as that reported  here.20  In view of the argument  just made,  it 
20. Robert Holbrook and Frank Stafford,  "The Propensity  To Consume Separate 
Types of Income: A Generalized  Permanent  Income Hypothesis,"  Econometrica,  Vol. 
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is of particular  interest  that the Holbrook-Stafford  result  is based  on data 
excluding  social  security  and other  retirement  benefits. 
THE  COEFFICIENT ON  PAYROLL  TAXES 
The  coefficient  on personal  contributions  to social  insurance  can be read 
as implying  that  the typical  consumer  sees  socialized  saving  as regular  sav- 
ing.  As already  noted,  since  the contributions  by employees  are  matched  by 
employers,  a coefficient  in the neighborhood  of -2  is to be expected,  given 
that view by the taxpayer.21  On the other  hand, if households  view these 
contributions  as a tax that will never  be recovered,  the coefficient  on ASI 
should  be close to that on AT.  Thus, the results  seem  to support  strongly 
the view  that households  consider  contributions  to social  insurance  a form 
of saving  and  even offset  it slightly  more  than  dollar  for dollar.22 
However,  before accepting  this conclusion  unreservedly,  at least three 
other  factors  must  be considered.  First,  the  relationship  between  changes  in 
payroll  taxes  (with  respect  to both rate  and  base)  and  future  benefits  is ex- 
tremely  loose at best.  In this  case,  a coefficient  of -2  requires  the consumer 
to have either a "highly  sophisticated  irrationality,"  or a strong  implicit 
trust  that  the government  will return  later  what  it takes  now-and  with  in- 
terest.  Secondly,  increased  payroll  taxes in the aggregate  can  come about  in 
any  of four  different  ways:  (1) increased  incomes,  (2) a higher  tax rate,  (3) a 
higher  maximum  wage  base subject  to taxation,  or (4) increased  coverage. 
21. This result,  incidentally,  is consistent  with a recent  finding  of R. J. Gordon  about 
the effect of increases  in payroll  taxes on money wage demands.  In "Inflation  in Reces- 
sion and Recovery," Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity (1:1971), pp.  121-22, 
Gordon concludes  that, while in the long run the incidence  of these payroll  taxes-the 
employer's  contribution  as well as the employee's-is borne  by the employee,  in the short 
run he attempts  to escape  the tax through  an increased  money  wage.  If this is so, the fact 
that the burden  of the tax in the short run is borne entirely  by saving is precisely  what 
should  be expected. 
22. George  Katona,  in Private  Pensions  and  Individual  Saving  (University  of Michigan, 
Institute  for Social  Research,  Survey  Research  Center,  1965),  claims  to have shown with 
survey  data that pension plans stimulate  voluntary  saving. This would not be the first 
time that cross-section  and time series analyses of saving have led to  an apparent 
contradiction,  but in this instance,  the matter  is obscured  by Katona's  unusual  definition 
of saving  (see his p. 44). He defines  saving  as the change  in liquid  assets,  thus  disregarding 
nonliquid  assets (such as houses and equities  in life insurance  and pension funds) and 
liabilities. In Katona's regressions,  moreover, only certain dummy variables,  loosely 
related  to the amount  of saving,  but never  the actual  amount  of saving  itself (even on his 
definition),  are used as dependent  variables. 398  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1971 
Obviously all four of these have operated over the period of the sample, but 
because they have proceeded sporadically and at differential  rates, the large 
negative coefficient on ASI could result from unknown errors of aggrega- 
tion. Finally, in a year when the maximum wage base for the payroll tax in- 
creases, the actual collection of payroll taxes is affected for the most part 
only in the third and fourth quarters.  However, in anticipation, the Office of 
Business Economics changes its seasonal factors, with the result that, when 
seasonally adjusted, the data will show a change in the first and second 
quarters as well as the third and fourth. This practice, too, could bias the 
estimate of the coefficient. 
Unfortunately, the effects of these factors are uncertain and could, in 
principle, lead the coefficient to be too low rather than too high. Their im- 
portance, therefore, remains at this time a matter of judgment. 
Finally, it should be noted that because of the way personal saving is de- 
fined in the national income accounts, the results on payroll taxes are some- 
what inconsistent with the basic logic of the zero-depreciation  model, which 
holds that in the (static) long run saving is zero. Since payroll taxes are in- 
cluded neither in disposable income nor in saving, this result implies that 
when the official estimate of saving is zero, actual saving is equal to the sum 
of employees' and employers' contributions to social insurance.23 
THE  COEFFICIENT  ON  PERSONAL  TAXES 
Arthur Okun has recently observed: 
Ever  since  economists  have  become  interested  in fiscal  policy,  they have operated 
generally  on the fundamental  premise  that changes  in after-tax  income  resulting 
from a change  in personal  tax rates  are basically  equivalent  in their  influence  on 
consumption  to changes  in income  arising  from  other  sources.24 
The large negative coefficient  on AT-which  in absolute value is significantly 
different statistically from the coefficient on gross income-strongly  con- 
tests this view. However, as Okun notes in the sentence following that just 
quoted, the support for the "fundamental  premise" is primarily analytical. 
As far as previous empirical support is concerned, the experience following 
23. In principle,  one could allow for the long-run coefficient  on personal  contribu- 
tions to social insurance  to be other than zero by including  in (6) the past level of SI as 
well as its first  difference.  This makes  long-run  equilibrium  saving  in (6), when  St =  St-I, 
a function  of the level of equilibrium  SI. I tried  this, but the result  made  little sense  (even 
to me). 
24. Okun, "The Personal  Tax Surcharge,"  p. 171. Lester D. Taylor  399 
the big tax cut in 1964  is consistent  with  the premise,  but the evidence  sur- 
rounding  the surtax  in 1968  is somewhat  mixed.25 
In principle  the model should allow a separate  tax coefficient  for each 
type of income.  Since  the unavailability  of a breakdown  of tax payments 
according  to income  source  makes  it impossible  to do this,  the  coefficient  on 
AT  will therefore  be an amalgam  of the coefficients  attaching  to all of the 
components  of personal  income,  but especially  to labor and property  in- 
come,  since  they are  the most  important. 
In an effort  to allow  for the errors  in aggregation  introduced  by the use of 
a single  variable,26  I have  experimented  with  including  a trend  in the coeffi- 
cient on AT.  This coefficient  was negative,  possibly  reflecting  the growing 
importance  of labor  income  in the total, but its t-ratio  was  less than 1, and 
consequently  I have  not tabulated  the results.  In light  of this and  also of the 
fact  that  the  marginal  propensities  to save  on labor  income  and  property  in- 
come  do not seem  to be very  different,  my opinion  is that  no serious  error  is 
involved  in using  a single  variable  for tax payments. 
Perhaps  more  seriously,  my  estimates  implicitly  assume  that variations  in 
tax payments  arising  from  changes  in the general  level of economic  activity 
have the same influence  on saving  and consumption  as variations  arising 
from  changes  in tax rates.  This, unfortunately,  is a tough question  to iso- 
late, because  the extent  to which  the assumption  is valid  will depend  upon 
what happens  to asset values, consumers'  expectations,  and the income 
distribution  when  tax rates  are  changed,  and  also  upon  the particular  goods 
affected  by the public  expenditure  (or lack  thereof). 
Any final assessment  of the coefficient  on AT-indeed, of all of the co- 
efficients  in this model,  except  that on St1-must  take account  of the fact 
that  it refers  only  to developments  within  one quarter  of any  change.  In the 
(static)  long  run,  the fundamental  postulate,  cited  by Okun,  that  consumers 
behave  rationally  with  respect  to their  budget  constraints  is necessarily  sat- 
isfied  since  all disposable  income  is consumed  irrespective  of source.  In this 
context,  saving is a transitory  phenomenon,  and, accordingly,  I find no 
25. See ibid.; and Robert Eisner,  discussion of Okun's paper, Brookings  Papers on 
Economic  Activity  (1: 1971),  pp. 207-09, and "Fiscal  and Monetary  Policy  Reconsidered," 
American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 59 (December  1969),  pp. 897-905. 
26. No errors  of aggregation  would arise  if (1) a common tax parameter  attached  to 
all types  of income,  or (2) all types  of income  grew  at the same  rate.  There  is little a priori 
basis for assuming  the first,  and the second is factually  incorrect  since labor income has 
grown somewhat  relative  to property  income during  the postwar period. 400  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1971 
a priori  reason  why  it should  be influenced  in the same  way  by a change  in 
taxes  as by a change  in earnings.27 
Further  Analysis  of the Results 
The results  appearing  in Table 1 have been subjected  to further  tests. 
First, I have investigated  the pattern  of intercorrelation  among  the vari- 
ables.  Next I have  split  the sample  period  at 1962,  estimating  the model  for 
1953-61  and  then  again  for 1962-69  in order  to test for homogeneity  of un- 
derlying  structure  over  the entire  sample  period.  And finally,  I have  experi- 
mented  with  a more  flexible  lag structure. 
THE  PATTERN  OF INTERCORRELATION 
One possible  explanation  of the anomalies  that have been found  is that 
they are purely  statistical  phenomena  arising  from an unfortunate  pattern 
of intercorrelations  among  the predictors.  While  the magnitude  of the t- 
ratios argues  against  this as a likely factor, it deserves  more explicit  in- 
vestigation.  Table  3 records  the correlations  for the variables  appearing  in 
equations  (1), (2), and  (3) of Table  1. The  simple  correlations  among  the in- 
dependent  variables  appearing  in equation  (3) are  quite  small,  and accord- 
ingly  there  is no picture  of a system  of predictors  that is highly  interdepen- 
dent.  Hence  it seems  reasonable  to take  the coefficients  as reflections  of real 
phenomena  rather  than simply  as statistical  flukes  arising  from poor ex- 
perimental  design  on the part  of history.28 
27. Robert Hall has pointed out that, while the s's in the structural  equation  repre- 
sent short-run  derivatives,  the long-run  asset-income  ratio is determined  by their ratios 
to b (see Houthakker  and Taylor,  Consumer  Demand,  p. 288). To illustrate  this, suppose 
the model is simplified  to S = bA +  s, Y +  s2 T. In the (static)  long run, S =  0, so that 
A  SI  S2  T 
Y  b  b  VY 
which  shows  that, since  both b and S2  are  negative,  the ratio of financial  wealth  to before- 
tax income varies inversely  with average  tax rates. At a glance, this does not seem im- 
plausible.  On the other hand, the high ratio implied for transfers  is puzzling,  as Hall 
states. 
28. Because  of the presence of the lagged dependent variable as a  predictor, the 
Durbin-Watson  coefficient  has not been provided as an indicator of the presence or 
absence of autocorrelation  in the error term. Instead, autocorrelation  has been tested 
for by the new method  recently  proposed  by James  Durbin, "Testing  for Serial  Correla- Lester D. Taylor  401 
HOMOGENEITY WITHIN  THE  SAMPLE PERIOD 
Splitting  a sample  period  into two or more  subperiods  permits  a test of 
the hypothesis  that the underlying  structure  governing  the phenomena  be- 
ing studied  is homogeneous  over  the entire  period  of the sample.  In the cur- 
rent  context  it is of particular  interest  and importance  to find out whether 
the coefficients  attaching  to the changes  in transfer  payments,  personal  con- 
tributions  to social  insurance,  and  personal  taxes  might  be due simply  to a 
few isolated  extreme  observations.  The vehicle  for making  this determina- 
tion is a well-known  test involving  the analysis  of covariance.29  The proce- 
dure  is to estimate  the model  for  each  of the  subperiods  and  then  to examine 
by means  of an F-test  whether  doing  so produces  a significant  reduction  in 
unexplained  variance  as compared  with estimation  of the model over the 
entire  period.30 
The  equations  for  the  two  subperiods  are  as  follows  (data  are  per  capita): 
1953:1-1961:4 
(7)  St =  0.966 Si-,  +  0.482  (AL +  AP)t +  1.410  ATRt  -  2.176 ASI! 
(45.62)  (4.18)  (2.33)  (-2.11) 
-  0.729 AT, +  0.579 Art. 
(-1.70)  (0.05) 
R2  = 0.690,  Se  =  8.89. 
1962:1-1969:4 
(8)  St =  0.974 St-,  +  0.353  (AL +  AP)t +  0.722 ATRt  -  2.216  ASIt 
(21.41)  (1.68)  (1.69)  (-2.38) 
-  0.930 ATt  +  31.93 Art. 
(-3.74)  (2.36) 
RI  =  0.839,  So  =  12.58. 
tion in Least-squares  Regression  when Some of the Regressors  Are Lagged Dependent 
Variables,"  Econometrica,  Vol. 38 (May 1970),  pp. 420-21. For several  of the equations, 
there  is a suggestion  of slight  negative  autocorrelation,  but this can be dismissed  as being 
of no consequence. 
29. For a description  of the test and its underlying  theory, see Gregory C. Chow, 
"Tests of Equality between Sets of Coefficients  in Two Linear Regressions,"  Econo- 
metrica,  Vol. 28 (July 1960), pp. 591-605; and Franklin  M. Fisher, "Tests of Equality 
between Sets of Coefficients  in Two Linear  Regressions:  An Expository  Note," Econ- 
ometrica,  Vol. 38 (March 1970), pp. 361-66. 
30. The sample period was split at 1962 because (1) it is near the mid-point of the 
sample; (2) it can be taken as marking  the real start of the sustained  upward  movement 
of the 1960s;  and (3) the two subperiods  coincide  almost exactly  with occupancy  of the 
White House by different  parties. 5^N ON  en  ON  0  t-  0 
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Here and in the following  equations,  the numbers  in parentheses  are t- 
ratios.  These  two equations  are  to be tested  against  equation  (3) of Table  1. 
The  data  for the analysis  of covariance  are  set out in Table  4. 
To reject  the hypothesis  that the two subperiods  have a common  struc- 
ture  requires  an F-ratio  of at least  3.80 (at the  0.05 level  of significance  with 
56 and 6 degrees  of freedom).  Consequently,  since  the observed  F is only 
about  one-third  of this value,  the hypothesis  cannot  be rejected. 
The biggest  difference  revealed  in a comparison  of values  of individual 
coefficients  for the two subperiods  is in the coefficient  for the change  in the 
yield on Baa bonds.  Indeed,  the interest  rate  has no influence  at all in the 
earlier  period, and its importance  in the equation  for the entire period 
clearly  derives  from  the observations  at the end of the sample  period  when 
interest  rates  were  taking  off to their  historic  highs  in 1970. 
The coefficient  on the change  in personal  contributions  to social insur- 
ance shifts little between  the two subperiods,  and, though the difference 
between  the two coefficients  on the change  in personal  taxes  is sizable,  the 
value  of -0.73  in the  earlier  subperiod  is still  much  larger  (in absolute  value) 
than that on gross income.  Another  coefficient  with contrasting  values  is 
that  on the change  in transfer  payments.  But  here  again,  even  the smaller  of 
the two values-0.72-is  remarkably  large. 
Table 4.  Analysis of Covariance  Test for Stability of Coefficients of 
Saving, 1953:1-1961:4,  and 1962:1-1969:4 
Equation  Residual  sum  Degrees  of  Mean 
and  statistic  Period  of squares  freedom  square 
(3), Table 1  1953:1-1969:4  7061.57  62  113.90 
(7)  1953:1-1961:4  2360.24  30  78.67 
(8)  1962:1-1969:4  4115.22  26  158.28 
Sum of residual  sum 
of squares  "with- 
in" regressions  ...  6475.46  56  115.63 
Reduction  in residual 
sum of squares  due 
to different regressions  ...  586.11  6  97.69 
F 115.63  11  F=97691.18 
97.69 
Fo.o6(56,  6)  3.80 
Source: Based on data in Table 1. 404  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1971 
A  MORE FLEXIBLE LAG  STRUCTURE 
The lag structure  implicit  in the model expressed  in equation  (4) is very 
restrictive.  It allows a change  in any of the components  of disposable  in- 
come  to have  only one direct  shot at saving;  any  retarded  effect  is reflected 
in the adjustment  of saving  to changes  in the underlying  stock of financial 
wealth.  In addition  to this simplicity,  the lag structure  is also rather  inflexi- 
ble in that each component  of disposable  income  is forced  into the same 
pattern  of adjustment.  In view of these possible  defects  in specification,  I 
have estimated  an equation  in which  the current  and  two most recent  past 
changes  are included  as predictors  for the components  of disposable  in- 
come  and  the yield  on Baa  bonds.  This  inclusion,  of course,  consumes  quite 
a number  of degrees  of freedom,  and, even  more  serious,  multicollinearity 
is likely  to accompany  the introduction  into the system  of so many  new  in- 
dependent  variables.  Still,  since  these  are  all first  differences,  possible  prob- 
lems with multicollinearity  would not seem to be so great  as to preclude 
estimating  the model.  The results  are  as follows  (data  are  per  capita): 
(9)  St =  0.951 St-,  +  0.431  (AL +  AP)t +  1.071  ATRt 
(38.90)  (4.66)  (2.94) 
-  1.633  ASIt -  1.095 ATt +  22.043  Art -  0.102  (AL +  AP)t1 
(-2.33)  (-5.16)  (2.02)  (-0.93) 
+  0.448 ATRt-1 +  0.780 ASIt-J +  0.406  ATt-,  +  2.628 Art- 
(1.15)  (1.14)  (1.93)  (0.22) 
+  0.097  (AL +  AP)t2  -  0.368  ATRt-2  +  0.258 ASIt-2 
(0.85)  (-1.02)  (0.38) 
-  0.315  ATt-2  -2.614  Ar,-2. 
(-1.42)  (-0.22) 
RI =  0.871,  So =  10.46. 
These  results  do not support  a conclusion  that the rather  rigid  lag struc- 
ture  implicit  in equation  (4) amounts  to a serious  misspecification,  for none 
of the  lagged  terms  appears  with  a t-ratio  of 2 or greater.  Lagged  effects  (ex- 
cept  for the geometric  lag implicit  in the presence  of Sf_1)  seem  to be absent 
altogether  for the change  in gross  income  and in the yield on Baa bonds, 
and to be only weakly  present  for the change  in transfers  and in personal 
contributions  to social  insurance.  Only  for the change  in personal  taxes  do 
lags of any importance  appear,  but the switching  of signs suggests  that 
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All in all, the tests of this section  do not vitiate  the results  obtained  with 
the model  embodied  in equations  (2), (3), and  (4). The large  coefficients  on 
transfer  payments  and  personal  taxes  remain  intact,  and  the  large  coefficient 
on personal  contributions  to social  insurance  is not greatly  modified.  Only 
the yield  on Baa  bonds  exhibits  a basic  change  in structure  within  the sam- 
ple period,  and  this is consistent  with  the view  that only in the most recent 
quarters  of the sample  have  interest  rates  been  sufficiently  high  to influence 
saving  discernibly. 
Forecasts  of the Personal  Saving  Rate  for 1971:1-1972:4 
Table  5 presents  estimates  and  projections  of the personal  saving  rate  us- 
ing the equations  tabulated  in Table 1 for the sixteen quarters  1969:1- 
1972:4.  These  quarters  involve  three  separate  periods:  1969  is the last year 
of the sample  period,  and the forecasts  for these four quarters  are simply 
the fitted  values  from the equations  converted  to saving  rates.  The figures 
for the period 1970:1 through  1971  :2 are forecasts  beyond  the period of 
fit, and  use actual  values  for disposable  income  and  its components  and  the 
yield on Baa bonds,  but predicted  values  of lagged  saving.  In current  par- 
lance, the simulation  for those six quarters  is thus dynamic  rather  than 
static.  Finally,  the numbers  for 1971  :3-1972:4 are  projections.  For dispos- 
able  income  and  its  components  beginning  in 1971:3,  I have  used  the  values, 
somewhat  modified,  appearing  in the Wharton  Mark  III Model  forecast  of 
May 21, 1971.  The Baa  bond  rate  is also based  on the Wharton  forecast  of 
that date.3'  The  values  of the predictors  are  also given  in Table  5. 
Two features  of these forecasts  are particularly  worthy of note: the 
marked  difference  between  the equations  with  disposable  income  disaggre- 
gated and those with disposable  income  taken in the aggregate;  and the 
especially  good performance  of the disaggregated  saving  functions-espe- 
cially  equation  (3)-over the six quarters  of actual  forecast  1970:1-1971:2. 
The  disaggregated  equations  signal  strongly  the sharp  increase  in the sav- 
ing rate  between  the last quarter  of 1969  and  the third  quarter  of 1970.  The 
nondisaggregated  functions,  on the other  hand,  anticipated  this  rise  scarcely 
at all. The factor  making  for the sharp  increase  in the saving  rate  forecast 
for 1970:2  by equations  (3) and  (6) is the $7 billion  increase  in transfers  re- 
31. I am grateful  to Michael McCarthy  for making  these numbers  available  to me. z  4 4U  ?  *  *  *  *  W o  "t  C1  tt  en  C1 C  4  N  en en 
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sulting  from  the liberalization  of social security  benefits  at that time. The 
further  liberalization  that  went  into effect  in the second  quarter  of 1971  ac- 
counts for the jump in the forecast  saving  rate for that quarter.  On the 
other  hand,  the small  drop  in the saving  rate  forecast  for the first  quarter  of 
1971  is accounted  for by the increase  in payroll  taxes  that went  into effect 
January  1. 
Finally,  the projections  for  the remainder  of 1971  and 1972  show  the sav- 
ing  rate  decreasing  during  the  final  two quarters  of 1971  to around  7 percent 
and  then  taking  a fairly  sharp  further  fall, primarily  as a result  of an addi- 
tional increase  in payroll  taxes, in 1972:  1. Thereafter  little movement  is 
projected. 
Final  Assessment 
If the results  of this  paper  were  taken  at face  value,  current  views  regard- 
ing the use of fiscal  instruments  in short-run  stabilization  of the economy 
would  be due for major  reassessment.  However,  in their  present  form,  the 
results  quite clearly  cannot-and should not-be  taken at face value. A 
great  deal  more  testing  is required  before  this  can  be done,  and  in its course, 
some (or even all) of the puzzles  may disappear.  The additional  testing 
should  involve  cross-section  as well as time  series  data,  and  should  employ 
alternative,  and  perhaps  more  suitable,  definitions  of saving  and  income.32 
The analysis  here has ignored  any effects  of capital  gains on saving,  and 
these,  too, require  investigation.  Finally,  there  is the whole  question  of an- 
nouncement  effects,  which may cause consumers  to adjust their saving 
prior  to the time  that  policy  changes  actually  occur. 
Nonetheless,  I am quite  convinced  that the results  obtained  here are of 
sufficient  validity  to raise  legitimate  questions  about  the view  that a dollar 
of income  is a dollar  of income  no matter  what  its source;  Indeed,  this is the 
principal  conclusion  that  I wish  to draw. 
32. Of the several  suggestions  for definitional  changes,  the easiest to execute  is one 
by George  Jaszi  to augment  the official  measure  of saving  by the statistical  discrepancy. 
Doing this yields,  among other  things,  an increase  in the coefficient  on ATR  to 1.24 and a 
decrease  in the coefficient  on ASI to -2.34. Comments  and 
Discussion 
James Duesenberry:  I am a little perplexed  in  commenting  on Lester 
Taylor's  paper.  I think it is a very interesting  and valuable  study,  but it 
produces  some startling  results  that I am not prepared  to accept.  Yet the 
results  have a certain  robustness;  they stand up when collinearity,  addi- 
tional lags, and subperiods  are investigated. 
There  is something  here, in my judgment;  but the interpretation  may 
not be exactly  what  the author  has in mind.  At first  glance,  the model  ap- 
pears  to be a standard  stock  adjustment  model  with  the special  feature  that 
the assets  are supposed  to be limited  to financial  ones.  In fact,  that limita- 
tion is not quite  true since  equity  in houses  and  unincorporated  businesses 
must  be included.  On a closer  look, however,  it is not really  a stock  adjust- 
ment model, because  as a result of some transformations  and a shift to 
first differences,  the asset term evaporates  and is replaced  by the lagged 
saving  flow variable.  Since  that variable  does not accurately  measure  the 
change  in wealth,  since strong  serial  correlations  so often appear  in time 
series  analyses,  and since  the coefficient  on lagged  saving  is very close to 
unity, I suspect  that the result  is very close to a first  difference  model in 
flows  rather  than a stock adjustment  model. 
What does it mean?  If the stock adjustment  theory  is to be taken seri- 
ously, one would have to be concerned  about durable  goods purchases, 
capital gains, and other elements  that make the increase  in household 
wealth  different  from  the official  concept  of personal  saving.  Instead,  Tay- 
lor allows  the asset  effect  to evaporate  so that it has little or nothing  to do 
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with  the results.  That  procedure  has some significance  for the meaning  of 
the coefficients.  As Taylor  pointed  out, what he presents  are impact  co- 
efficients.  These  coefficients  try to tell us what  happens  to saving  (and  pre- 
sumably  to consumption)  in a single quarter  if there is an increase  of a 
certain  type of income  in that quarter. 
Factors  that might  influence  the basic  longer-run  propensity  to save are 
irrelevant  in this context.  In the case of property  income  versus  labor  in- 
come, for example,  the question  of relative  class positions  or of different 
levels  of family  income  really  has  little  to do with  impact  effects.  One  would 
expect  the short-run  differences  to be dominated  by timing  considerations 
or the stability  of the variables.  If entrepreneurial  income  were very un- 
stable,  one certainly  would  expect  to find a high  propensity  to save out of 
one-quarter  changes  in it. In fact,  the broader  concept  of property  income 
contains  several  very smooth  series,  including,  as Taylor  pointed  out, the 
imputed  income from housing,  and also including  much of the imputed 
financial  income,  interest  credited  at savings  banks  not directly  received  by 
depositors,  and  corporate  dividends.  It is, therefore,  not surprising  that  the 
property  income coefficient  does not behave  the way one would expect 
entrepreneurial  coefficients  to behave.  In general,  what governs  the one- 
quarter  bang from a particular  type of buck may be different  from what 
determines  how much  people  are going  to spend  over  a couple  of years  of 
the dollars  they get from some particular  source.  It is important  to bear 
this in mind  in interpreting  the results. 
Future  investigations  building  on Taylor's  findings  should  devote  more 
attention  to the longer  lags. More attention  will also have to be paid to 
incorporating  the asset effect.  The coefficients  of Taylor's  study  implicitly 
leave  a lot of money  unspent.  One  of two things  has to happen:  Either  the 
longer  lags  will  reveal  that  people  respond  directly  by spending  this income 
over  time, or else the income  has to pass through  the asset accumulation 
mechanism  and enter  the spending  stream  through  wealth  effects.  In the 
latter  case, it would  be very  difficult  to strain  out the impact  on assets  of 
particular  sources  of income, since data would have to be collected  on 
assets  by the composition  of income  of the asset  holders. 
When  one recognizes  clearly  that the coefficients  measure  only the one- 
quarter  impact,  some of the results  seem  less implausible.  It may  well turn 
out that people  do not spend  much  out of increased  transfer  payments  in 
the initial  quarter,  even  though  they  might,  over  a year,  spend  considerably 
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an open question,  because  Taylor's  interesting  test for lags is too limited 
to be conclusive. 
Taylor  offers  very  sensible  observations  as to why the impact  saving  co- 
efficient  on transfer  income  might  be particularly  high.  Suppose  low income 
people  with  modest  amounts  of assets  are  trying  to stretch  their  means  out 
over a long period of time, and meanwhile  inflation  has squeezed  them 
into depleting  their asset holdings.  When they get an increase  in social 
security  benefits,  it might  well  go initially  to replenish  the asset  pot that  has 
been drawn  down. 
A number  of additional  factors  could influence  the results  on transfer 
payments.  For one thing, there  may be some anticipation  effects  on con- 
sumption  that distort  the coefficient,  since  people often know a couple  of 
quarters  ahead  of time that a social security  increase  is forthcoming.  Sec- 
ond, medicare  has contributed  much  to the growth  of transfers  in recent 
years.  Medical  expenses  are very  closely  related,  I think,  to asset  manage- 
ment  and  saving.  Without  medicare,  payments  for some  very  large  medical 
costs would have required  dipping  into assets.  Medicare  has reduced  the 
need for dissaving  and thus, almost  mechanically,  has bolstered  personal 
saving. 
The results  on social insurance  contributions  are too good to be true. 
There is, in fact, no close relationship  between  expected  social security 
benefits  and contributions.  There  is only a very  loose kind of connection, 
depending  on the recipient's  age, how many quarters  he has paid at the 
ceiling  in the past, and other  considerations.  Nobody knows  exactly  what 
he is ultimately  going to get out of social security.  Even though people 
generally  get out a lot more  than  they put in, there  is a lot of slippage  be- 
tween  the inflows  and outflows.  It would be a remarkable  coincidence  if 
people acted as though  they were saving  the contribution  and responded 
as  Taylor's  coefficients  indicate.  The  technical  problem,  which  Taylor  notes, 
about  the way in which  increases  in the wage  base  for social  security  taxes 
are recorded  in the national  income  accounts,  may have something  to do 
with the finding  that the net coefficient  is changed  substantially  by con- 
sidering  a couple  of lagged  quarters. 
I cannot offer any solid explanation  for the high saving  coefficient  on 
personal  taxes.  I do not know  why there  should  be virtually  no impact  on 
consumption  in the particular  quarter  in which taxes are changed  while 
there  is a sixty-cent  impact  per  dollar  in any  quarter  in which  labor  income 
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There  is a difference  between  the tax accruals  and  tax payments  in the per- 
sonal income tax, creating another seasonal adjustment  complication, 
which  may influence  the coefficient.  Finally,  the interest  rate coefficient  is 
very  suspicious,  and I would  be inclined  not to pay too much  attention  to 
it, since  it does not show up at all in the 1953-61  subperiod,  but only in 
the 1962-69  period. 
In summary,  these  results  certainly  ought  to be followed  up. They  make 
a good running  start  on determining  the impacts  on saving  and consump- 
tion of income  by component,  particularly  those components  that can be 
manipulated  by fiscal  policy.  A good deal more information  is necessary, 
however,  before policy can be guided  on the basis of these coefficients. 
This is particularly  true since  they are limited  mainly  to the impact  in the 
current  quarter,  and tell us very little about what happens  subsequently. 
Robert  Hall: In reading  Taylor's  paper,  I hoped to be enlightened  about 
the peculiar  recent  behavior  of saving,  and I am frankly  disappointed.  I 
do not find Taylor's  explanation  of the high saving  rate in 1970-71  at all 
convincing.  The basic explanation  offered  is that transfers  have gone up 
remarkably  and that a particularly  large  fraction  of transfer  payments  is 
saved.  Consequently,  the saving  rate  rises  when  the composition  of income 
shifts  toward  transfers.  I just do not believe  that. Instead  of providing  re- 
liable  information  about  saving  out of different  components  of income,  the 
paper  really shows, as I see it, that an aggregate  consumption  or saving 
equation  that looks pretty  good superficially  begins  to crumble  apart  once 
one probes  beneath  the surface.  What we discover  in taking apart such 
aggregate  equations  is that they ignore  many  important  things  and do not 
perform  as well as we initially  thought. 
There  are  several  sources  of trouble  in the paper.  The first  is an ambigu- 
ity about what those saving  coefficients  measure.  This is an acceleration 
theory of asset accumulation,  which  implies  that, if income  is steady,  the 
level of assets  will also ultimately  be steady.  According  to the theory,  the 
structural  coefficients  measure  the long-run  relationship  between  the in- 
come  flows  and  the corresponding  asset  stocks,  and  not merely  the impact 
effect.  In particular,  they imply  that a certain  level of assets  corresponds 
to each component  of income. And the specific  estimates  for transfers 
imply  that  the assets  held  by a person  who  receives  transfer  income  are  very 
much  higher  than  those held  by people  with  the same  level of income  com- 
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tionalized  along  the lines of the theory.  Hence  I read  it as a possible  symp- 
tom of some pathological  condition  in the whole equation. 
Second,  I feel that a life cycle  model  ought  to take  account  of the demo- 
graphic  composition  of the population.  I have  no reason  to believe  that  the 
demographic  shifts  of the last few  years  would  contribute  to an explanation 
of the high  saving  rate.  On  the contrary,  the increase  in the relative  number 
of young  people  in the working  population  might  be expected  to lower  the 
saving rate. Nonetheless,  I am concerned  that the age make-up  of the 
population  is ignored  in spite of the very  strong  importance  assigned  to it 
in the life cycle  kind of theory  that motivates  this work. 
A further  and serious  source  of difficulty  is the reliance  on the definition 
of personal  saving  embodied  in the national  income  accounts.  That view 
fundamentally  identifies  the wealth  of consumers  with the real wealth of 
the economy.  The stock market,  for example,  is ignored,  and owners  of 
equities  are taken as simply  owning  the real assets  of corporations.  That 
occurs  because  capital  gains  and  losses are  ignored,  and saving  is taken  as 
equal  to investment.  In actuality,  there  is a substantial  gap  between  the real 
wealth  of the economy  and the market  valuation  of the assets owned  by 
consumers.  The stock market  was fluctuating  over this period and may 
have contributed  to the peculiarly  high saving  rate of 1970 and 1971.  A 
treatment  of that issue  would  require  a definition  of saving  different  from 
the one in the national  income  accounts. 
Additional  problems  arise from the use of the definition  of consumer 
durables  in the national  income  accounts.  Purchases  of consumer  durables 
should not be considered  consumption  expenditures.  Rather, durables 
should be treated  the same way as housing  with the flow of services  re- 
garded as consumption  expenditures.  That approach  smooths out the 
fluctuations  in purchases  of durables  that have  taken  place  in the last few 
years. 
Finally, the national  income accounts  do not treat corporate  retained 
earnings  as income  to the consumer  and thus do not take account  of the 
substantial  fluctuations  in retained  earnings  of recent  years.  I'm not sure 
of the right way to handle  retained  earnings,  but certainly  the problem 
should  be confronted  rather  than ignored. 
A fundamental  problem  in this study is the econometric  problem  of 
identification.  Nothing in the equation  specifies  it as a saving equation 
rather  than an investment  equation.  Since  saving  equals  investment  (with 
some  adjustment),  the equation  could  be relabeled  an investment  equation Lester  D. Taylor  413 
and it would  represent  an accelerator  model of investment  rather  than an 
accelerator  theory  of saving.  Given  all these  problems,  it seems  to me that 
one cannot  trust  the conclusions,  which  seem  so vastly  different  from  what 
common  sense  suggests.  Hence,  after  I finished  reading  Taylor's  paper,  the 
peculiar  behavior  of personal  saving in the past three years remains  a 
mystery  to me. 
George  Jaszi:  I want  mainly  to supply  added  emphasis  to a few points  that 
have already  been raised  about  the data and concepts.  Duesenberry  men- 
tioned that some of the quarterly  series on income components  were 
smoother  than others.  Much of the smoothness  is a reflection  of the way 
estimates  have  to be made  rather  than  of the working  of the economy.  For 
instance,  the quarterly  series  on property  income  is very smooth because 
only annual data are available  for many of the items included  and the 
quarterly  figures  are essentially  interpolated.  In the case of income  of un- 
incorporated  enterprises,  use is made of quarterly  information  on sales, 
but no quarterly  data are available  on the variation  in profit margins. 
Quarterly  information  is available  on wages, salaries,  and transfer  pay- 
ments;  they are genuinely  fluctuating  series  and have a minimum  of sta- 
tistical smoothing.  All other income items essentially  represent,  to  an 
extent,  an artificial  quarterly  series.  This distinction  may have important 
implications  for the regression  results. 
The treatment  of social security  taxes is a peculiarly  difficult  problem. 
There  is no good answer  to the problem  posed  by an increase  in the ceiling 
on wages  subject  to tax. I know OBE's  present  procedure  is not good, but 
I much  prefer  it to any alternative  I have heard  suggested  so far. 
There are similar,  although  not identical,  timing difficulties  with the 
treatment  of year-end  or final settlements  on personal  taxes. They affect 
the accounts  heavily  in the first  and second  quarters  of the year  following 
the year  of liability.  This  creates  bulges,  if the final  settlements  are  large,  or 
negative  bulges  if refunds  are large.  The resulting  statistical  peculiarity  of 
the series  may create  problems  in a regression  analysis. 
Since  personal  saving  is measured  as a residual  within  the framework  of 
the national  income accounts,  one should  recognize  that personal  saving 
plus  the statistical  discrepancy  is an equally  legitimate  alternative  measure- 
ment of household  saving.  It would be interesting  to know whether  the 
results of the regression  equations  would hold up using that statistical 
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General  Discussion 
Several  participants  argued  that the time series  data could not provide 
reliable  answers  to the important  questions  posed by Taylor,  no matter 
how much  effort  and ingenuity  he applied.  Both Thomas  Juster  and R. J. 
Gordon  felt that a time span of a single  quarter  was too short, given  the 
statistical  "noise"  in the data and the variability  of actual  consumer  be- 
havior.  Gordon  noted  that,  because  personal  saving  is measured  residually 
as the difference  between  income  and  consumption,  the errors  of measure- 
ment  in both income  and  consumption  get built  into the saving  series;  this 
may introduce  spurious  correlations.  He suggested  experimenting  with 
variables  measured  as average  changes  over two or three quarters  in an 
attempt  to reduce  the influence  of quarter-to-quarter  noise. 
Juster  warned  that even  the modest  amount  of collinearity  among  varia- 
bles (reported  in Table  3) could  create  problems  in the multiple  regression 
approach.  Moreover,  the exploration  for lagged effects surely ran into 
serious  collinearity  problems  in an attempt  to pick  out the relative  strength 
of relationships  of particular  variables  to a current  quarter's  saving  and  pre- 
vious  quarter's  saving,  respectively.  Lawrence  Klein  considered  it desirable 
to build  in some  a priori  constraints  on the time  series  coefficients  based  on 
cross-section  data from consumer  surveys.  Although  the survey  data are 
not good enough  to establish  the whole  relationship,  they  can be relied  on 
for pieces  of information  on either  the relative  sizes of various  coefficients 
or the magnitude  of particular  coefficients  like  that on transfer  income.  The 
optimal  research  strategy,  according  to Klein,  required  a blending  of cross- 
section  and time series  evidence. 
The discussion  also returned  to the conceptual  and definitional  issues 
involved  in personal  saving.  Klein noted one hidden  virtue  of the defini- 
tion: It was so far removed  from investment  that he doubted  any serious 
problem  of identification  remained,  in contrast  with  Robert  Hall's  concern 
about  this issue.  Juster  stressed  the heterogeneity  of personal  saving.  Very 
different  forces influence  such diverse  components  as the extension  and 
repayment  of consumer  credit,  increases  in housing  equity,  and  liquid  asset 
accumulation.  It is hard  to believe  that  the forces  affecting  important  parts 
of personal  saving  do not influence  its total. Hence  it seemed  doubtful  that 
saving behavior  could be adequately  explained  by means of the com- 
ponents  of aggregate  income,  given  the heterogeneity  of aggregate  personal 
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Nancy  Teeters  pointed  out that, furthermore,  recipients  of transfer  pay- 
ments were not a homogeneous  group. The behavior  of social security 
beneficiaries,  who are  not subject  to a means  test, is probably  quite  different 
from  the behavior  of recipients  of welfare  and other  types of benefit,  who 
are. Lawrence  Klein, in turn, questioned  the uniformity  attributed  to the 
lag structure.  Taylor's  use of lagged  personal  saving  implied  that saving 
reacted  in the same  dynamic  fashion  to changes  in the various  components 
of income.  There are good reasons  to suspect  that the time patterns  of 
response  might  be quite  different  for different  components. 
R. A. Gordon  suggested  that  it might  be useful  to inspect  the errors  of the 
equations  in those quarters  when  jumps in some variables  occurred  as a 
result  of discrete  policy  changes,  such as variations  in personal  and social 
security  tax  rates  or in transfer  benefit  programs.  The announcement  effects 
of such policy  measures  could create  disturbances  in the saving  rate both 
before and after important  policy changes.  The dynamic  patterns  here 
might  differ  considerably  from  those associated  with  changes  in income  or 
in taxes  that take place  more gradually  and continuously. 
R. J. Gordon  questioned  the treatment  of the interest  rate variable.  He 
contended  that it was inconsistent  for the interest  rate  to be scale-free  in a 
regression  where  all the other  variables  were  expressed  as dollar  changes. 
Furthermore,  he suggested  that the efforts  to determine  how much of the 
interest  rate  effect  really  stemmed  from  the difference  between  nominal  and 
real  rates  should  have  employed  the second  rather  than  the first  derivative 
of the price  level.  Presumably,  after  a time,  the level  of interest  rates  reflects 
the rate of change  of prices;  it would  be pushed  up further  only by an ac- 
celeration  of prices. Since the entire  impact of the interest  rate variable 
occurs  in the second  half of the sample  period,  it raises  the possibility  that 
the interest  rate  variable  is recording  largely  the impact  of inflation  on sav- 
ing. Franco  Modigliani  suggested,  however,  that the interest  rate variable 
may be picking  up some of the effects  of large  movements  of interest  rates 
on stock  prices  and,  via that  route,  on consumption. 
Modigliani  stated  that, despite  all the reservations  about  the results  ex- 
pressed  by the author  and the discussants,  the equations  were  impressive 
in tracking  saving  behavior  in 1970-71.  In particular,  that recent  period 
was not included  in the sample  period  for fitting  the equations.  Although 
Taylor's  results  may  reflect  in large  measure  peculiarities  in the way  certain 
components  of disposable  income  are  estimated  in the national  income  ac- 
counts, his equation  may still be useful for short-run  forecasting  of the 
national  income  accounts  saving  rate. 